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"'A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and
philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as
well concern himself with his shadow on the wall." RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in
ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES 58, 58 (1856), available at http://www.emersoncentral.coml
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In the United States, as in no other country, taxes have played a
foundational role in the shape and tenor of our government. Often cited as a
spark that ignited the American Revolution, Samuel Adams led the Boston Tea
Party in response to Britain's Tea Act of 1773, which exempted the East India
Company from a tax on tea without providing a similar exemption for colonial
merchants.2 It was a coup for tax consistency. After the Revolution, the
perception that citizens of some states bore more of the war's cost than the
citizens of other states proved crucial to organization of the Constitutional
Convention.3 The subsequent debate borne out in the Federalist Papers
revealed a presupposition that the newly formed government would rule by fair
consensus and not by fiat.4 Time and again, our history has been shaped by
taxpayers' demands. The country is not now so removed from the tax
upheavals of 1776 and 1789 that the Service should be permitted to act with
inconsistency simply because it is an arm of the government.
Our nation's birth notwithstanding, courts have insisted for more than
three-quarters of a century that taxpayers owe a duty of consistency to the
Service, but that the reverse is not true. In most instances, the Service may
favor one taxpayer and discriminate against another, even when the two are
virtually identical. This puzzling state of affairs resulted from courts'
insistence that one taxpayer cannot escape his or her lawful burden simply by
proving that the Service showed lenience to another taxpayer. When the
Service breaks the rules for one taxpayer, others cannot complain when they
are required to abide by them. In many instances, courts' decisions in
consistency cases have turned on whether Congress gave the Service statutory
permission to be lenient. Where lenience is within the Service's discretion,
taxpayers can fight for consistent treatment. But where the Service employs
rogue leniency, or exercises de facto discretion, a taxpayer who is prejudiced
by the Service's action has no administrative or judicial recourse.
It should not be the case. Instead of resulting in a race to the bottom or a
lowest common denominator system of taxation as courts have predicted,
application of a broad duty of consistency to the Service would improve the
2See 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 556 (15th ed. 2002) (providing brief history of Tea
Act of 1773), available at http://www.britan nica.com/eb/article?tocld=9071501 &query=
boston20tea2Oparty&ct=(2005).3See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 225-42 (2004) (discussing sequence of
events leading to Constitutional Convention).4 For instance, The Federalist states:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment
of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is
responsible, free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the
people.
THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Walter Dunne ed., 1901).
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quality of written advice while furthering fair administration of the revenue
laws. As a result, I argue for application of such a duty. Section II examines
the duty of consistency as it applies to taxpayers. Section III discusses the duty
of consistency that currently applies to the Service and concludes that the duty
provides inadequate protection. Section IV reviews arguments in favor of the
taxpayer duty of consistency and demonstrates that these apply with equal
force to the Service. Finally, this Article concludes that reasons for adopting a
broad duty of consistency applicable to the Service outweigh the reasons
against it. Application of a broad duty of consistency to the Service is both fair
and necessary.
II. TAXPAYER DUTY OF CONSISTENCY
A. Origin of the Duty of Consistency
Although it has evolved over the years, the taxpayer duty of consistency
began with the R. H. Stearns Company of Boston, Massachusetts.5 The
company's 1917 and 1918 income and profits tax returns were audited by the
Service, and to facilitate a thorough and correct audit, the company signed two
waivers of the statute of limitations.6 The Commissioner signed one but forgot
to sign the other, making it potentially invalid.7 At the conclusion of his audit,
the Commissioner made an assessment in excess of twenty thousand dollars,
which the company paid.8 Six years passed, and the company discovered the
Commissioner's mistake.9
The company filed a claim for a refund of its 1918 taxes based on the
faulty waiver.'0 During trial, testimony revealed that the company had asked
the Service to suspend collection activity until the Service completed its audit
of all of the company's open years." As requested, the Service delivered the
1918 assessment at the end of the comprehensive audit.' 2 The Supreme Court
noted that the company's request for delayed collection of its 1918 taxes
"reached forward into the future and prayed for the postponement of
collection."' 13 As a result, the company could not later change course and seek
protection from the statute of limitations.' 4 The Court held that "[t]he
applicable principle is fundamental and unquestioned. He who prevents a thing
from being done may not avail himself of the nonperformance which he has












himself occasioned .... [N]o one shall be permitted to found any claim upon
his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong."'' 5 And so the taxpayer
duty of consistency was born.
B. Current Formulation of the Duty of Consistency
1. Three-Part Test
The same principle, in a more crystallized form, continues to apply to
taxpayers today. The modem duty of consistency has three generally accepted
prerequisites to application.' 6 First, the taxpayer must have "made a
representation or reported an item for tax purposes in one year.' 17 Second, the
Commissioner must have "acquiesced in or relied on" the taxpayer's
representation for that year.' 8 Finally, the taxpayer must desire to change its
representation in a later year, after the statute of limitations has expired for the
original year. 19 According to one court, "[a] taxpayer in this situation, innocent
or otherwise, who has already had the advantage of a past alleged
misstatement-such advantage now beyond recoupment-may not change his
posture and, by claiming he should have properly paid more tax before, avoid
the present levy., 20 In other words, if a case satisfies the three-pronged test, the
Service can continue to rely on the taxpayer's original representation even
though the representation was incorrect.
2. A Third Party May Bind the Taxpayer
The duty of consistency applies not only to statements made by the
taxpayer but also to statements made by parties in financial privity to the
21 . 22taxpayer. In LeFever v. Commissioner, heirs sought to avoid an election
made by the executor of an estate to make qualified use of farmland property.23
The Tenth Circuit held that the heirs could not avoid the executor's election
24because the duty of consistency applied. The court wrote that "the duty of
consistency is usually understood to encompass both the taxpayer and parties
1
5ld. at 61-62 (citations omitted).
16See Michael E. Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule: A Proposal for Resolving the
Substance-Form Debate, 48 TAx LAW. 289, 291 (1995) (listing three elements of taxpayer duty
of consistency); Steve R. Johnson, The Taxpayer's Duty of Consistency, 46 TAX L. REV. 537,
543, 549 (1992) (same).
17Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211,212 (8th Cir. 1974).
181d.
191d.20
d.21See id. at 212-13; Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
22100 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1996).
231d. at 788.241d. at 789.
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with sufficiently identical economic interests. 25 The heirs, the court
concluded, had an economic interest in reducing the value of the estate at the
time the estate tax return was filed.26 As a result, the duty of consistency
precluded them from adopting a different position after expiration of the statute
of limitations on the estate's liability.27 Other courts have reached similar
28conclusions.
3. Taxpayer's Statement
According to the second prong of the duty of consistency, the Service
must rely on the statement of a taxpayer or a party in privity. This requirement
raises two lines of inquiry: what constitutes a statement, and what constitutes
reliance by the Service. It is clear that the definition of "statement" must
include oral representations and returns filed with the Service. But what about
unreported income? In a Private Letter Ruling, the Service held that the failure
to claim an item of income that the taxpayer had an affirmative duty to report
was a representation for purposes of the duty of consistency. 29 The Service's
conclusion seems like a self-serving way to defeat the statute of limitations,
and at least one court has taken a contrary position. In Ross v. Commissioner,
30
the court wrote that "[a] mere failure to report income is not a representation
that such income has in fact not been received.",31 The court likened the
taxpayer' s omission to an interpretation of law, and noted that "it seems settled
that estoppel cannot be predicated upon a mere ... silence resulting from an
error of law."32
The Ross court's decision addresses only intentionally omitted income,
leaving open the question of whether an inadvertent omission of income might
be a statement for purposes of the duty of consistency. Because unintentional
omission of income cannot be construed as a taxpayer's interpretation of the
law, the Ross case will not govern, and the subject is open to debate. On one
hand, rendering a statement is generally thought of as an affirmative act, while
an unintentional omission is not an act at all. On the other hand, at least one
court has held that the duty of consistency applies even if a taxpayer had no
251d. at 788.
26 1d. at 788-89.271d. at 789.
28See, e.g., Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding heirs to be
bound by elder brother's choices on estate tax return); Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 464
(Ct. Cl. 1976) (holding heirs to be bound by statements made by executor of estate); Shanafelt v.
United States, No. 96-1295-RE, 1997 WL 810907, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 8, 1997) (holding
shareholders to be bound by statements of closely held corporation); Cluck v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.
324, 335-36 (1995) (holding wife to be bound by husband's statements made in joint return).291.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-15-013 (Jan. 6, 1997).





knowledge of the previous misrepresentation. 33 In other words, "personal
knowledge is not an element of the duty of consistency. ' 34 Under that view, it
is possible that unintentional omission of income that later causes inconsistent
reporting could be a statement for purposes of the duty even though the
taxpayer has done no affirmative act.
4. Service's Knowledge
Courts have ruled that the Service cannot rely on a taxpayer's statement if
the Service has reason to suspect the veracity of that statement.35 Thus, the
Service's knowledge is crucial. The Ross case put it simply, finding that "a
party may not successfully claim reliance on a misrepresentation when he
ought to have known the truth., 36 The Ross court looked to the Brooklyn City
Railroad Co. case, in which the Commissioner's claim for estoppel failed
because "the facts which he claimed to be misrepresented were available at all
times on the books of the taxpayer. 3 7 The Eighth Circuit ruled likewise in
Helvering v. Williams.38 In that case, a taxpayer relinquished relevant
documents to the Service during an audit, but the revenue agent assigned to the
case did not notice the taxpayer's misrepresentation.39 The court wrote that "if
the taxpayer makes timely disclosure of all the material facts to the
Commissioner or to his representative there can be no ground for an
estoppel."'4 The court held that the Commissioner was not misled by the
taxpayer's factual misrepresentation; therefore, the duty of consistency did not
apply.41 Finally, the Tax Court reached a similar conclusion in 1991 when it
held that the Service had gathered sufficient information during the course of
an audit to place it on notice that the taxpayer's prior representations were
false.42
5. Three-Pronged Summary
Based on the paragraphs above, we can make three observations about the
three prongs of the taxpayer duty of consistency. First, parties in privity to or
with the same economic interests as a taxpayer can make statements that are
binding on the taxpayer for purposes of applying the duty. Second, the Service
believes that a taxpayer may make a statement by omission as well as by
33See Baldwin v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1915, 1928 (2002).341d.
35E.g., Ross v. Comm'r, 169 F.2d 483, 495 (1st Cir. 1948).36
1d.




42See Erickson v. Comm'r, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2073, 2078 (1991).
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commission. Third, the duty does not apply if the taxpayer provides the
Service with information that is, in the first instance, sufficient for the Service
to determine that the taxpayer has made a factual misrepresentation. These
elements are important for understanding the operation of the duty of
consistency and for crafting an equivalent applicable to the Service.
C. Application of the Duty of Consistency
The duty of consistency's three-pronged test is most effectively assessed
in its operation. Because the duty of consistency can apply to any
misrepresentation of fact by a taxpayer, cases relying on it are myriad.43 The
following four paragraphs develop the flavor of these cases and provide a
representative sample of the doctrine's application. A theme predominates: a
taxpayer cannot have his cake and eat it too.
First, in Alamo National Bank of San Antonio v. Commissioner,44 taxpayer
Lewis Alexander and his wife owned the San Antonio Coca-Cola Bottling
Company, which acquired an exclusive franchise to bottle Coca-Cola in certain
Texas counties.45 The taxpayers dissolved the bottling company, and in
computing their income upon liquidation, failed to include their exclusive
franchise as an asset.46 However, in a later year, when the taxpayers sold the
business, they included the basis of the franchise in the basis of the business.47
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the taxpayers could not use the
franchise basis.48 The court wrote that "what is done in one tax year is
sometimes projected into another where the same fact must govern. There
being continuity, there ought to be consistency in treatment. ' 49 The court
added that its ruling might be different if the taxpayer could correct its
omission in the earlier year.50 The court concluded that
[i]t is no more right to allow a party to blow hot and cold as suits his
interest in tax matters than in other relationships . . . .The law
requires restoration as a condition of rescission, just as equity
declares that one asking equitable aid must give effect to the equities
of his opponent.5
43See Baillif, supra note 16, at 290.










The First Circuit reached a similar result in Sterno Sales Corp. v. United
States.51 In that case, Sterno, Inc. paid a sales commission to a sister
organization, Sterno Sales Corporation, for its successful marketing of canned
heat.53 The Service found the commission excessive and disallowed Sterno,
Inc.'s deduction for the excess amount.54 Sterno Sales argued that it should be
allowed to treat the disallowed amount as a dividend rather than
compensation.55 The court invoked the duty of consistency, holding that "a
taxpayer must normally accept the tax consequences of the way in which he
deliberately chooses to cast his transactions (although the Internal Revenue
Service may not be bound by his choice). 56 The court wrote that "[i]t would
be quite intolerable to pyramid the existing complexities of tax law by a rule
that the tax shall be that resulting from the form of transaction taxpayers have
chosen or from any other form they might have chosen, whichever is less. 57
Finally, it concluded that "where, as here, it is the taxpayer alone who seeks to
impugn his own transaction for his own tax benefit, the courts will not pay
heed. 5 8
More recent cases have followed suit. In Shanafelt v. United States,5 9 the
taxpayers' company paid compensation to the taxpayers in the guise of loans. 60
The Service discovered the taxpayers' arrangement and suggested they either
prove the validity of the loans or instruct the company to write them off. 6 1 The
company wrote off the loans, and as a result, the taxpayers recognized
cancellation of indebtedness income.6 2 Later, the taxpayers paid back a portion
of the loans and attempted to repudiate the cancellation.63 The court held that
the duty of consistency prevented the taxpayers from changing their tax
position even though their financial position had changed.64 The court stressed
that the taxpayers did not inform the Service of the repayment and that the
Service relied on the taxpayers' characterization of the loans as forgiven.65 As
a result, the duty of consistency allowed the Service to continue to treat the
loans as forgiven.66
52345 F.2d 552 (Ct. C1. 1965).
531d. at 552.541d. at 553.551d.
561d. at 554.571d. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).581d. at 556 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).59No. 96-1295-RE, 1997 WL 810907, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 8, 1997).







HOBGOBLIN OF LITTLE MINDS NO MORE
Finally, the Tax Court adopted the duty of consistency in Estate of
Ashman v. Commissioner. 6 In that case, a taxpayer received a distribution
from her pension plan.68 The taxpayer missed the deadline for rolling over a
portion of the distribution into an IRA, but claimed on her income tax return
that the deadline had been met.6 9 She then rolled the delinquent portion into an
annuity. v When the taxpayer later received payments from the annuity, she
claimed that they were not includible in income because the annuity purchase
price should have been previously taxed as a result of the delinquent rollover.
7'
The court held that the duty of consistency prevented the taxpayer from
profiting from her prior mistake in reporting.7 2 The court wrote:
[T]he duty of consistency not only reflects basic fairness, but also
shows a proper regard for the administration of justice and the
dignity of the law. The law should not be such a[n] idiot that it
cannot prevent a taxpayer from changing the historical facts from
year to year in order to escape a fair share of the burdens of
maintaining our government.
7 3
The court concluded that "once a taxpayer has transfigured the true facts, the
power to change them back to their old form may well be lost. The taxpayer
cannot reshape them at will."
74
What wisdom can we distill from the Alamo, Sterno, Shanafelt, and
Ashman decisions? Three observations come to mind. First, courts view
taxation in a time continuum even though taxpayers must report their liability
annually. Although the statute of limitations may interpose between the
beginning and end of that continuum, it is a transparent, rather than an opaque,
expanse. As a result, courts can see and act on basic issues of fairness even
when the Service is barred from doing so by statute. Second, courts act in
equity when applying the duty of consistency. As a result, the equities of the
taxpayer's and the Service's positions, rather than their legal merits, are
important. Therefore, a court can equitably apply the duty of consistency in
favor of the Service even when a taxpayer would win as a matter of law.
Finally, the duty of consistency is predicated on two separate notions of
fairness. The first abhors the burden that tax evasion foists on other taxpayers.
The second abhors a tax cheat simply on principle. As I will discuss in Section
V, these dual notions of fairness apply with equal force to the Service.
67231 F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 2000).








III. CONSISTENCY AS IT APPLIES TO THE SERVICE TODAY
A. The IRS Duty of Consistency
The duty of consistency currently applies to the Service in very limited
circumstances, or not at all, depending on the jurisdiction in which the question
arises.75 In general, the duty applicable to the Service is a mirror image of that
applicable to taxpayers. In Alamo National Bank of San Antonio v.
Commissioner,76 the Fifth Circuit described the reciprocity as follows:
The taxpayer cannot say: "I was mistaken. The value was many times
what I said it was. I therefore realized less gain on the last sale,"
without doing justice all around in correcting his mistake. The
reverse principal is also true if the Commissioner, in reviewing the
return, should correct the first valuation and the taxpayer should
acquiesce. The Commissioner could not repudiate his action when
that value again became a determining factor.7 7
Strangely, this straightforward principle has not been followed uniformly
by the Service or by other courts. In a field service advice ("FSA")
memorandum, the Service acknowledged that the duty of consistency applied
to it, but limited the scope of that duty.7 8 The Service stated that the duty is
relevant only when (1) the Service makes a factual representation to the
taxpayer in one tax year, (2) the taxpayer acquiesces in or relies on the
representation, and (3) the Service changes the representation in a later year
after expiration of the statute of limitations. 79 Because it is generally taxpayers,
not the Service, who make representations of fact, the duty described by the
FSA will rarely apply to the Service.
This result, no matter how limited, is still better than the retrograde
motion recently exhibited by the Sixth Circuit, which held in an unpublished
decision that "the duty of consistency only applies against the taxpayer." 80 In
that case, the Service used a handwritten note to inform the taxpayer that the
Service was closing its case. 81 When the Service reopened the case, the
taxpayer argued, among other things, that the Service had violated the duty. 82
75See generally Johnson, supra note 16, at 537-49 (describing taxpayer's duty of
consistency and different approaches currently used by courts).
7695 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1938).
77d. at 623 (emphasis added).781.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200026006, at 7 (Mar. 21, 2000).
791d.
80Temple v. Comm'r, 62 F. App'x 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2003).
8 id. at 608.
8ld. at 608-09.
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The court disagreed and wrote that the doctrine was "completely inapplicable"
to the Service.83
In contrast, the court in Conway Import Co. v. United States84 held that
the Commissioner "owes a duty of consistency" to taxpayers not merely as to
factual representations but also "in his interpretation of the regulations." 85 In
that case, salesmen employed by the taxpayer, a wholesale food distributor,
paid "gratuities" to purchasers employed by the taxpayer's customers.86 The
taxpayer deducted the expenses and kept records of them according to Internal
Revenue Code section 6001.87 At the time the taxpayer did so, no regulations
required the taxpayer to keep records showing to whom the gratuities were
paid. 88 Nonetheless, for the first time upon audit, the Service disallowed the
taxpayer's deductions because it had not kept such records. 89 The court held
that the Service owed the taxpayer a duty of consistent interpretation of the
regulations until it notified the taxpayer that a new rule would apply in future
years.90 The court noted that doctrines of estoppel "should not be applied to
prevent retroactive correction of a mistake of law," but that there are
exceptions to the rule "based on the compelling equities of particular cases." 91
The court also held that the question was not one of "whether the
Commissioner may notify a taxpayer that a previously acceptable standard of
record-keeping will no longer be acceptable. At times it may be his duty to do
so. However, any such action should be accomplished with a minimum amount
of unfairness to the taxpayer.,
92
B. Other Consistency Doctrines Applicable to the Service
The notion that fundamental fairness requires the Service to consistently
apply the revenue laws is not confined to the "duty of consistency" in its
current formulation. Courts' decisions to employ or refuse consistency have
come in a variety of shapes. For instance, the consistency ideal has also
manifested itself in the IBM line of cases and in decisions on estoppel. The
permissible scope of taxpayers' reliance on the Service's rulings, both
published and private, is also relevant to the consistency inquiry. The
following paragraphs explore courts' holdings on these issues with a view
toward developing a broader duty of consistency applicable to the Service.
831d. at 609.
8431 1 F. Supp. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).851d. at 14.861d. at 8.
87Id. at 10. (citing I.R.C. § 6001 (1954) (amended 1976, 1978, 1982)).
881d. at 11. Treasury Regulation section 1.6001-1 imposed this duty, but this regulation
was not promulgated until 1959, two years after the taxpayer's alleged deficiency. See id. at 10.891d. at 12.
9ld. at 14.
9 11d.92 1d. at 15.
No. 2]
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1. Consistency under IBM
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States 9' ("IBM") has
long been touted by taxpayers as the flagship for an IRS consistency rule. In
that case, the Service granted a favorable ruling to Remington Rand but not to
its competitor, IBM. 94 Eventually, after allowing hundreds of thousands of
dollars to go untaxed, the Service revoked Remington Rand's ruling.95 Because
the revocation was prospective only, Remington Rand retained the benefit of a
tax exemption that the Service denied to IBM. 96 IBM subsequently sued for a
refund of the eleven-million-dollar excise tax that would have been relieved by
a ruling comparable to Remington Rand' S.97
The Court of Claims held that the Service had abused its discretion by
treating similarly situated taxpayers differently. 98 The court wrote that the
"leitmotif of [the Service's] defense is that taxpayers can never avoid liability
for a proper tax by showing that others have been treated generously, leniently,
or erroneously by the Internal Revenue Service." 99 It continued, "[t]hough our
tax law often takes that stance, the rule is not universal."' 00 More specifically,
the court found that section 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, which gave
the Service permission to revoke rulings prospectively, imbued the
Commissioner with an implied power not to collect taxes for a past period that
otherwise would be required by law.' 0' The court noted that use of this implied
power required discretion and that the existence of such discretion mandated
an implicit prohibition against its abuse.10 2 The Service must "consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the handing down of a ruling-
including the comparative or differential effect on the other taxpayers in the
same class."' 0 3 The court wrote that "[elquality of treatment is so dominant in
our understanding of justice that discretion, where it is allowed a role, must
pay the strictest heed." °4
93343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
94See id. at 916-17. The court held that Remington Rand's Univac systems were not
subject to an excise tax on business machines. Id. at 916. IBM requested a similar ruling for its
Type 604 systems. Id. After a great deal of delay and additional expense to IBM, the Service
refused to make a favorable ruling. Id. at 916-17.
951d. at 916.961d.
971d. at 921-23.
9 ld. at 923.
991d. at 919.
°°Id. (citation omitted).
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The consistency honeymoon soon ended. In Bornstein v. United States,
10 5
which was decided less than a month after IBM, the Court of Claims failed to
apply the IBM rule in a case where similarly situated taxpayers had not sought
a private letter ruling. 10 6 In that case, six corporations were created to own an
apartment complex. 0 7 The corporations were, by and large, identical.,0 8 After
the apartment complex was constructed, the corporations had excess mortgage
funds that they wished to distribute to their shareholders.' 0 9 One of the
corporations obtained a private letter ruling from the Service stating that the
distributions would be taxable as capital gains. "0 A Service employee who was
not authorized to sign rulings informed the corporations' counsel that it would
not be necessary for each corporation to obtain a ruling; rather, all of the
corporations could rely on a single ruling. 1' Following the distributions, the
Service allowed capital gains treatment to the shareholders of the corporation
that sought the ruling and assessed deficiencies against the shareholders of the
remaining corporations on the basis that those distributions were ordinary
income." 
2
The Bornstein shareholders presented two arguments to the Court of
Claims in favor of capital gains treatment. First, the shareholders argued that
the Service was estopped by its employee's statement that all of the
corporations could rely on a single ruling." 3 Second, the shareholders argued
that the Service was estopped by the private letter ruling granted to their sister
corporation.1 14 The Court of Claims refuted both arguments. It held that
[i]t is a settled principle of law that the United States is not bound by
the unauthorized acts of it agents, that it is not estopped to assert the
lack of authority as a defense, and that persons dealing with an agent
of the government must take notice of the limitations of his
authority. 115
As a result, the shareholders could not rely on the Service employee's
representation that there was no need to obtain individual rulings. 116 The court
also held that the shareholders could not rely on the ruling issued to their sister
15345 F.2d 558 (Ct. C1. 1965).








11 41d. at 562-63.
l 5 Id. at 562.1161Id.
No. 2] 329
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corporation. 117 The court noted that even if the shareholders had demonstrated
detrimental reliance on the ruling, "the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a
bar to the correction by the Commissioner of a mistake of law." 118 Finally, the
court distinguished IBM in a footnote, stating that it did not apply because,
unlike IBM, the Bornstein shareholders had not sought their own private letter
rulings. l19
The court's limitation on IBM retains vitality. The Court of Claims
seconded Bornstein with its holding in Knetsch v. United States,1 20 which was
decided two months later. 12 In addition, more recent decisions have limited
IBM to its facts. In a 1997 case, the D.C. Circuit held that a pension fund could
not demand the same treatment as similarly situated pension funds under IBM
because IBM applied only to competitors. 122 Because pension funds do not
compete with one another, the court held that relief was not available under
IBM. 123 Likewise, in a 2004 case, the Federal Circuit held that a taxpayer who
did not apply for a ruling was not entitled to relief from federal excise tax on
large vehicles under IBM even though its vehicles were indistinguishable from
those of its competitors who had received favorable rulings. 24 The Court of
Federal Claims reached a similar conclusion in another 2004 case when one
taxpayer requested a refund based on a letter ruling issued to another. 1
25
These cases miss a crucial point. Despite IBM's statute-based description
of discretion, the Service can exercise and abuse discretion even in areas of the
Internal Revenue Code that are textually nondiscretionary There are at least
two reasons for such exercise and abuse. First, Congress and the Executive
cannot (and should not) engage in detailed oversight of the entire operation of
the Service. As a result, the Service necessarily has the power of intentional or
inadvertent selective prosecution. Second, because the Service's resources are
limited, it exercises de facto discretion over its administrative function by
choosing which cases or areas of the law to pursue and how to pursue them.
The combination of underwhelming oversight, budgetary restrictions, and
overwhelming workload result in an implicit grant of real world, nonstatutory
discretion that I will refer to as "de facto discretion." Courts should require the
Service to exercise this de facto discretion with the same sensitivity that it
1171d. at 561, 563; see also id. at 563 (referring to Internal Revenue ruling that distributions
in question would be taxable as long-term capital gains in accordance with Internal Revenue
Code section 117(b)).
'"I1d. at 563.
91d. at 564 n.2 (discussing Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl.
1965)).
12'348 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
12 l'd. at 940 n.14.
122See Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke
Belangen v. United States, 129 F.3d 195, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
1231d. at 201.
124See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
125See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 501, 505-07
(2004).
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applies to its exercise of implicit discretion under section 7805 of the Code.
126
If courts recognized de facto discretion as a source of abuse, cases limiting the
IBM rule to section 7805 would become obsolete, and the IBM case itself
would support a broad-based application of the duty of consistency to the
Service.
The revisionist IBM doctrine that I have just described enjoyed a brief and
partial realization in Computer Sciences Corp. v. United States.1 27 In that case,
the Court of Federal Claims held that the Service abused its discretion when it
allowed certain taxpayers to deduct contributions to qualified benefit plans but
did not allow a similar deduction to similarly situated taxpayers. 128 The Service
based its decision solely on whether the taxpayers had filed their returns before
or after December 7, 1990.129 Like IBM, Computer Sciences Corp. was based
on section 7805 of the Code, but unlike IBM, it saddled the Service with a far-
reaching duty to treat taxpayers consistently.1 30 The court plainly stated, "[o]ne
situation in which the Commissioner's actions may constitute an abuse of
discretion is when similarly situated taxpayers are treated differently without a
rational basis for the disparate treatment."' 31 Looking to precedent, the court
went even further, finding that the lawfulness of the Service's position "had no
bearing upon the question of unreasonable discrimination,"' 132 and that "case
law makes clear that discrimination based solely upon an arbitrary factor... is
sufficient to conclude that the Service had abused its discretion.' In other
words, while the IBM court was only willing to find an abuse of the Service's
discretion under section 7805,134 the Computer Sciences Corp. court was
willing to find an abuse of discretion in any instance where the Service treated
similarly situated taxpayers differently.
13
History repeated itself, and the triumph was short-lived. Less than two
months later, the Court of Federal Claims disavowed any "exceedingly broad"
interpretation of the Computer Sciences Corp. decision in a lengthy footnote to
the Vons case. 136 The court noted that a broad interpretation of the opinion
1261.R.C. § 7805 (2000).
12750 Fed. Cl. 388 (2001).
'281d. at 396.
1291d




134See id. at 393-94 (citing Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 919 (Ct.
CI. 1965)).
135 See id. at 393-94, 397-98.
136 See Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, I1 n.10 (2001) (stating that
IBM decision is limited by Bornstein's second footnote in so far as it only applies where "(i) one
or more taxpayers in direct economic competition have each applied for a ruling and only one as
received a favorable ruling; and (ii) the taxpayer denied the favorable ruling is arguing that the




would be an "unwarranted extension" of IBM.137 The court then criticized
Computer Sciences Corp. for "separat[ing] IBM from its important factual
moorings" and for ignoring the Bornstein decision's limiting effect. 138 The
court wrote:
In general, notwithstanding Justice Frankfurter's oft-quoted
statement that "[t]he Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax
another without some rational basis for the difference," the manifest
weight of precedent rejects a "least common denominator" notion of
federal taxation, in which the law that the Congress actually enacts
can be short-circuited and disregarded any time the IRS has afforded
a single taxpayer or even a group of taxpayers treatment more
favorable than the law provides.
1 39
The Vons decision was a setback for taxpayers seeking consistent
treatment in the Court of Federal Claims. Worse, the Vons decision and others
like it are internally inconsistent. By noting that the Commissioner was able to
treat taxpayers more favorably than the law provides in forums other than
private letter rulings, the Vons court accidentally acknowledged that the
Commissioner's discretion extends beyond the implicit grant contained in
section 7805 of the Code. This unspoken acknowledgement undercuts the
limitation placed on IBM by the Bornstein court. Unfortunately, the Vons
court's failure to see the contradiction left the Commissioner's ability to rule
by fiat outside of the private letter ruling context undisturbed.
The Second Circuit made a more promising decision in Sirbo Holdings,
Inc. v. Commissioner. 14 In that case, the Service prosecuted an issue against
one taxpayer that it had conceded in the case of another taxpayer just two
months earlier. 141 Judge Friendly wrote that "the Commissioner has a duty of
consistency toward similarly-situated taxpayers; he cannot properly concede
capital gains treatment in one case and, without adequate explanation, dispute
it in another having seemingly identical facts which is pending at the same
time.' 142 The court added: "That the Commissioner's seeming inconsistency
may have arisen from the right hand's ignorance of the posture of the left is
little solace to taxpayers who are entitled to a non-discriminatory
administration of the tax laws."' 143 When, upon reconsideration in the Tax
Court, the Service admitted that its earlier concession had been a mistake, the
court relented, noting that the Service must be allowed to correct mistakes of
1371d.
1381d.
1391d. (quoting United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960)).
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law.144 The Second Circuit then fell into line and held that the error in one case
could not be perpetuated where the Service admitted its error and renounced its
earlier position. 145 As the Sirbo cases demonstrated, the IBM line of cases
keeps the idea of consistency fresh in the minds of taxpayers and judges, but it
has not yet proved reliable as a basis for application of a broader duty of
consistency to the Service.
2. The Limited Reach of Equitable Estoppel
Like the IBM doctrine, equitable estoppel is a consistency weapon of
limited range in tax cases because "it is well settled that the Government may
not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant. ' ' 46 In order to prevail
on an estoppel claim against the Service, a taxpayer must satisfy all of the
traditional estoppel elements 47 and a bonus malfeasance element. Even then,
the result may depend on the circuit in which the case is tried. 148 While the
Supreme Court has not flatly forbidden estoppel claims against the Service, it
has not expressly allowed them either.
149
Although the requirements vary among circuits, in order to satisfy
traditional estoppel elements, a taxpayer generally must prove that (1) the
Service knew all of the facts relevant to the case, (2) the Service intended or
the taxpayer reasonably believed that the Service intended the taxpayer to act
based on the Service's conduct, (3) the taxpayer was ignorant of the true facts,
and (4) the taxpayer detrimentally relied on the Service's conduct.150 Then, in
order to satisfy the additional element, the taxpayer must show that the Service
affirmatively engaged in misconduct amounting to more than mere
negligence. 15 In other words, demonstrating detrimental reliance on the
'44See Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r, 509 F.2d 1220, 1222 (2d Cir. 1975).
1451d.
'46Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
147See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 935 (1986) (finding that if government is subject to
estoppel, private party cannot prevail without at least demonstrating traditional elements of
estoppel).
148See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1.06[4], at 1-75 n.243 (rev.
2d ed. 2005) (explaining that Ninth Circuit applies estoppel against United States but other
circuits do not always agree, such as Eleventh Circuit, which uses three-part test).
149See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423 (1990) ("We leave for
another day whether an estoppel claim could ever succeed against the Government.").
150Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Taxpayer's Assertion of Equitable Estoppel against IRS
Based on Representations of IRS or Non-IRS Employees, 176 A.L.R. FED. 33, 51 (2002).
15'See Office of Pers. Mgmt., 496 U.S. at 429-30 (discussing requirement of Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (2000), that
government misconduct rise above negligence).
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Service's statements is not enough. 5 2 In addition, the doctrine does not apply
to mistakes of law.
153
The added burden of proving malfeasance makes equitable estoppel
claims against the Service difficult for taxpayers to prosecute. In addition, the
field of cases to which the doctrine of estoppel applies is narrow because
mistakes of law are excluded from the doctrine's operation. The result, that a
taxpayer cannot rely on statements of law made by employees of the agency
charged with administering the law, seems absurd. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has worried that acceptance of estoppel claims against the Service could
have "pernicious effects," stating that "[i]t ignores reality to expect that the
Government will be able to 'secure perfect performance from its hundreds of
thousands of employees scattered throughout the continent."",154 Allowing
estoppel claims, the Court has reasoned, "would only invite endless litigation,"
and would impose "an unpredictable drain on the public fisc."' 55 According to
the Court, the threat of such claims would not cause the government to give
better advice, but rather, less advice.156 In light of the Court's position, one
might legitimately ask, if these barriers prohibit a taxpayer from relying on
information given directly to him by the Service, how much less can that
person rely on information given to another taxpayer? As I will discuss in
Section IV, the specters of increased litigation and decreased advice, if they are
legitimate concerns, arise not only in the context of estoppel but also in the
context of a broad duty of consistency when applied to the Service.
Nonetheless, they do not outweigh the need for consistent application of the
revenue laws.
3. Taxpayer Reliance on the Service's Rulings
A third source of the consistency doctrine arises from taxpayer reliance on
the Service's rulings. The equitable estoppel cases described above make it
clear that a taxpayer can almost never rely on the Service's oral or informal
statements. The result is different for some, but not all, of the Service's written
products. Taxpayers can generally demand consistent treatment based on
revenue rulings, subject to the Service's ability to correct a mistake of law. 157
In contrast, private letter rulings may only be relied on by the taxpayers to
152See Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 343 (1984) (holding that Commissioner's
change in position was permissible even if taxpayer detrimentally relied on former articulation).
153See Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1957) (holding that
estoppel would not prevent Commissioner from retroactively revoking ruling erroneously
granted).
154 Office of Pers. Mgmt., 496 U.S. at 433 (quoting Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 954
(2d. Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
1551d.
1561d.
157See Treas. Regs. § 601.702(d) (as amended in 1983).
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whom they are directed.1 58 A taxpayer's ability to rely on written rulings is
crucial to the application of a broad duty of consistency to the Service because
the Service's pronouncements are predominantly delivered via the written
word. The following paragraphs describe the extent to which reliance on
written rulings is permitted by courts and the Service.
(a) Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures
Treasury Regulation section 601.601(d) states that a revenue ruling is "an
official interpretation by the Service," the purposes of which are "to promote
correct and uniform application of the tax laws by Internal Revenue Service
employees and to assist taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary
compliance." 59 Revenue rulings are "directly responsive to and limited in
scope by the pivotal facts stated in the revenue ruling."1 60 Their use by courts
has been relatively uncontroversial until the past decade.' 6' Generally, courts
agreed that revenue rulings were not binding. 62 For instance, in 1982, the
Ninth Circuit found revenue rulings useful for interpretive purposes but held
that "they are not conclusive statements of the law."163 The court also wrote
that "[a] revenue ruling that conflicts with the revenue laws must be
ignored."' 64 This position echoed the general consensus among courts until the
beginning of the 1990s.
Since then, courts have treated revenue rulings with greater deference due
to the deliberative nature of their creation. 65 Professor Linda Galler has noted
that revenue rulings are unique among Service pronouncements because they
share characteristics common to both regulations, which receive deference
from courts, and private letter rulings, which do not. 166 She has written:
Confusion as to judicial weight is prevalent only with respect to
revenue rulings because they are hybrids. Like regulations, revenue
rulings apply generically rather than to a single recipient, as do letter
rulings. Revenue ruling issuance procedures, however, more closely
resemble those of letter rulings, which are released without the sort
of public participation that is mandated as to regulations. 1
67
15'See I.R.C. § 6110 (2000).
159Treas. Regs. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a), (d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1983).
'6°d. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a).
161See Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent
Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1056 (1995).
1621d.
163Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 1982).
164id
165See Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173, 180 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that
revenue rulings are agency interpretations entitled to respect if persuasive, and that Second and
Ninth Circuits have afforded revenue rulings "great deference").




Based on this description, the logical -conclusion is that courts should give
revenue rulings less deference than regulations, but more deference than
private letter rulings. More deference should, in turn, result in greater
consistency.
Today, most courts treat revenue rulings with some form of deference,
and only the Tax Court continues to treat the rulings as though they were
merely the arguments of a litigant.168 A recent Sixth Circuit case, Aeroquip-
Vickers, Inc. v. Commissioner,169 gave a well-supported explanation of courts'
deference to revenue rulings.170 When urged by a taxpayer to disregard a
revenue ruling, the Sixth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's decision in
Christensen v. Harris County,171 which held that agency interpretations such as
opinion letters, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines are entitled to
deference only to the extent that such interpretations have the power to
persuade a court.17 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that revenue rulings were
similar to the interpretations discussed in Christensen because, when drafting
them, the Service does not "invoke its authority to make rules with the force of
law." 173 The court then noted the Supreme Court's additional holding that
although agency opinion letters are not entitled to Chevron deference, they
"may merit some deference whatever its form" based on an agency's
specialization and its access to information. 74 Finally, the Sixth Circuit looked
to the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball
Co.,"'75 which held that revenue rulings reflect the Service's long-standing
interpretation of its own regulations and are entitled to "substantial judicial
deference."' 176 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the revenue ruling in the
Aeroquip-Vickers case was a plausible interpretation of the law and, as a result,
the court afforded deference to the ruling.
177
For a taxpayer who seeks to contravene a revenue ruling, the circuit
courts' deference, however limited, might be troubling news. In contrast, the
news is good for a taxpayer who seeks to hold the Service to a duty of
168See Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Whereas
virtually every circuit recognizes some form of deference, the Tax Court stands firm in its own
position that revenue rulings are nothing more than the legal contentions of a frequent litigant."
(citations omitted)). But see Kosow v. Comm'r, 45 F.3d 1524, 1529 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1995) ("An
IRS ruling is not the product of notice and comment procedures, but is merely an opinion of an
IRS attorney. While taxpayers may assert their holdings as a shield, they do not have the effect
of law and are not binding on the courts." (citations omitted)).
169347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003).
7'Id. at 180.
17'529 U.S. 576 (2000).
172Aeroquip-Vickers, 347 F.3d at 180 (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).1731d.
1741d. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001)).
175532 U.S. 200 (2001).
176Aeroquip-Vickers, 347 F.3d at 180 (citing Cleveland Indians Baseball, 532 U.S. at 220).
1771d. at 182 (referring to Rev. Rul. 82-20, 1982-1 C.B. 6).
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consistency based on its written rulings. For instance, in Estate of
McLendon,178 the Service sought to disavow application of a revenue ruling
where the ruling would have produced an unusually favorable result for the
taxpayer. 79 The court, after discussing the level of deference due revenue
rulings, wrote that "[t]he Commissioner cannot eat his cake and have it too.'
180
The court held that the taxpayer was entitled to rely on the legal standard
implied by the revenue ruling and found that the taxpayer had, in fact, done
so.18 The court noted that the Service had specifically approved the ruling and,
as a result, "could not be heard to fault a taxpayer for taking advantage of the
tax minimization opportunities inherent therein."'
182
The Service itself seems to agree with the McLendon court's view. In
Revenue Procedure 89-14, it stated that revenue rulings "are published to
provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be
cited and relied upon for that purpose."' 183 In addition, the revenue procedure
states that "[tlaxpayers generally may rely upon revenue rulings and revenue
procedures published in the Bulletin in determining the tax treatment of their
own transactions and need not request specific rulings applying the principles
of a published revenue ruling or revenue procedure to the facts of their
particular cases."' 84 This statement is echoed in the regulations.1 85 Although
the question might arise as to how much deference a court must give the
revenue procedure's statements regarding revenue rulings, in general, it seems
as though a taxpayer can expect consistent treatment based on revenue rulings.
As a side note, it is worth mentioning revenue procedures. According to
the regulations, a revenue procedure is "a statement of procedure that affects
the rights and duties of taxpayers."' 86 Revenue procedures are issued for the
same purposes as revenue rulings: to promote uniform application of the laws
by the Service and to maximize voluntary compliance by taxpayers. 87 In
contrast to the regulations applicable to revenue rulings, the regulations
applicable to revenue procedures do not provide for taxpayer reliance. In
addition, a number of courts have held that revenue procedures are directory
rather than mandatory,' 88 which could cut either for or against the taxpayer
depending upon whether the taxpayer seeks to disavow or demand treatment
consistent with a published procedure. Although a full exploration of the issue
'135 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1998).
1791d. at 1024-25 (referring to Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194).
'S° Id. at 1024 n.13.
"'Id. at 1025.
1821d.
183Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, § 7.01(4).
1841d. § 7.01(5).
185See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(e) (as amended in 1983).
1161d. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(b).
117See id. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii).




is beyond the scope of this Article, at least one court has required the Service
follow a revenue procedure where the procedure was the only clear indication
of the Service's position on a particular transaction.189 There seems to be hope,
then, that revenue procedures could be used in addition to revenue rulings as a
basis for requiring consistent treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.
(b) Private Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda
The most voluminous source of Service guidance is its body of private
letter rulings. Although the Service has some obligation to act in a manner
consistent with the guidance provided by it in revenue rulings and revenue
procedures, the same is generally not true for private letter rulings, which are
provided for the benefit of a single taxpayer. The Internal Revenue Code
specifically provides that private letter rulings may not be used as precedent.190
Regardless, there are two important exceptions to the general rule of
nonreliance. The first, discussed above, is found in IBM.'91 Second, some
courts, including the Supreme Court, have looked to private letter rulings for
evidence of administrative interpretation.
The Supreme Court first addressed the use of private letter rulings in
Hanover Bank v. Commissioner.92 In that case, the Court was called on to
interpret section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code. 193 The Court noted that,
after a period of consistent interpretation, the Commissioner was "reversing the
position he had previously and uniformly adhered to in a series of private
[letter] rulings." 194 After reaching a tentative conclusion based on the statute's
language and legislative history, the Court turned to the private letter rulings as
"[plersuasive evidence" that its interpretation was correct.' 95 The Court wrote
that, "although the petitioners are not entitled to rely upon unpublished private
rulings which were not issued specifically to them, such rulings do reveal the
interpretation put upon the statute by the agency charged with the
responsibility of administering the revenue laws."' 196
Hanover was decided prior to Congress's enactment of section 61 10(k)(3)
of the Code. That section, which was adopted in 1976, states that the Service's
written rulings may not be used or cited as precedent. 97 Commentators have
'89E.g., id. at 865.
'9 See I.R.C. § 611 O(k)(3) (2000).
191See Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 915 (Ct. CI. 1965); see also
infra Part III.B.1 (discussing consistency under IBM).
192369 U.S. 672,686-87 (1962).
193See id. at 686 (citing I.R.C. § 125 (2000)).
'941d. at 687 n.21.
1951d. at 686.
1961d.
197See I.R.C. § 61 10(k)(3) (2000).
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noted that the statute's language is less than clear.198 Specifically, the meaning
of "precedent" is opaque.' 99 The section's legislative history indicates that
Congress meant to prevent one taxpayer from relying on a ruling issued to
another. 200 The rule as it relates to people, then, is not difficult to apply.
How the rule affects the Service and courts is less obvious. The IRS
Manual forbids employees from relying on, using, or citing letter rulings as
precedent; however, the Service maintains prior rulings in a reference file and
relies on them when dealing with similar requests.2 ' In addition, when an
employee finds that a prior ruling position should be reversed or modified, the
employee may issue a new ruling only with the blessing of counsel. 0
2 These
protocols demonstrate that the Service generally values consistent treatment of
taxpayers and relies on prior letter rulings as a means of achieving it.
203 The
same luxury is not afforded to taxpayers by Congress or courts, although some
courts have circumvented the rule in recent years, as discussed below.
(c) The Policy of Section 6110 and Consistency
Prior to the enactment of section 6110 of the Code,2° private letter rulings
were unpublished. By preventing taxpayers from demanding consistent
treatment based on private letter rulings, Congress sought to stem the
dampening effect that publication might have on the ruling process.205 In other
words, if the Service were bound by private letter rulings placed into
publication, it would have to subject them to the same scrutiny applied to
revenue rulings and revenue procedures. Congress worried that additional
scrutiny would slow the ruling process, making it less accessible to
taxpayers. 20 6 In effect, Congress traded reliability for a limited form of
efficiency. In a faster ruling process, Service employees would be more likely
to make interpretive errors; however, deadweight loss to taxpayers resulting
from time lag would be minimized.
This reasoning-that a speedier ruling process promotes efficient
transactions by limiting lag time-results in an acceptable compromise.
Although it accounts only for efficiency of the taxpayer seeking the ruling and
fails to consider the dozens of other taxpayers who might be similarly situated,
198See Galler, supra note 161, at 1057; Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the
Internal Revenue Service to Be Consistent?, 40 TAX L. REV. 411, 439-43 (1985).
199Galler, supra note 161, at 1057.2O0id.
2 1 1d. at 1057-58 (citing Internal Revenue Service Manual 153 (1992)).
202Id. at 1058.
203See Zelenak, supra note 198, at 439 (referencing rulings that were important tools in
Service's pursuit of uniformity and correctness).2°4Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 6110 (2000)).20 5See Zelenak, supra note 198, at 436-37 (citing S. REP. No. 94-938, at 311 (1976)).
2°6d. (citing S. REP. No. 94-938, at 311).
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the ill effect of its narrow scope is offset by its dissemination of knowledge.
The most efficient scenario possible is one that allows additional taxpayers to
demand consistent treatment based on the first taxpayer's ruling. Of course,
section 6110 of the Code prevents this scenario. If we assume, as Congress did,
that a faster ruling process increases the likelihood of interpretive errors,
allowing additional taxpayers to rely on the first taxpayer's ruling would result
in an inaccurate measure of revenue, which could favor either the government
or the taxpayers, but which, in either case, would be a distortion of
congressional intent. Therefore, Congress's true choice in enacting section
6110(k)(3) of the Code was between fairness and efficiency for taxpayers and
proper administration of the revenue laws. Rather than favor one over the
other, Congress split the bill by mandating publication of rulings while
forbidding taxpayer reliance on those rulings. This choice represents a practical
compromise that neither supports nor undercuts application of a broad duty of
consistency to the Service. As one commentator noted, if the Service is
permitted to use private letter rulings for consistency purposes, courts should
be able to do the same even though the taxpayer cannot.207
(d) Section 6110 Is Compatible with Consistency
Enactment of section 61 10(k)(3) actually had little effect on the Supreme
Court's treatment of private letter rulings. In Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United
States,2°8 a post-enactment ruling, the Supreme Court was called on to
determine the validity of a regulation, and it looked to private letter rulings for
assistance.209 The taxpayer in the case owned and operated offshore oil rigs and
had not included room and board in its employees' wages for purposes of
FICA 2'0 and FUTA,211 despite a regulation requiring it to do SO. 2 12 The
taxpayer claimed that the regulation's broad description of wages was
invalid.1 3 The Service countered that the regulation had Congress's
imprimatur because the underlying statute had been adopted without legislative
214amendment of the regulatory definition. As part of its argument, the Service
alleged that its interpretation of the word "wages" had been consistent for anumber of years. 21 5 The Court disagreed, based on its analysis of relevant
207See id. at 443-47 (discussing cases in which courts have considered private letter
rulings).
218452 U.S. 247 (1981).
2°9See id. at 261-62, 262 n.17.210 .R.C. §§ 3101-28 (2000).
21 1jd. §§ 3301-11.
212Rowan Companies, 452 U.S. at 249 (citing I.R.C. § 3402(a) (2000)).2131d. at 251.2141d. at 258.2 51d.
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private letter rulings. 16 The Court noted that although the rulings had no
precedential value as a result of section 61 10(k)(3), they had evidentiary value
with regard to the Service's actions.217 Because the rulings were inconsistent
both before and after Congress considered the FICA and FUTA statutes, the
Court found that Congress could not have approved the Service's
* 218interpretation.
The Supreme Court's use of private letter rulings in Rowan differed from
its use of them in Hanover. In Rowan, the Service claimed consistent
administration as proof of regulatory validity, which put the content of its
* 219rulings at issue. 1 In Hanover, by contrast, the Court itself put the content of
the Service's rulings at issue by relying on them to support its statutory
interpretation. 220 Note, however, that although Hanover was decided prior to
the enactment of section 6110(k)(3), the Court stated that the taxpayer could
not rely on the rulings.221 As a result, the intervening enactment of section
6110(k)(3) and the Court's subsequent decision in Rowan should not foreclose
Hanover-style use.
In fact, the Court's most recent foray into the status of the Service's
informal rulings confirms that the door is still open.222 In Hill, the Court was
asked to decide a technical question about taxpayers' bases in mineral
interests. 23 As part of their argument, the taxpayers cited a technical advice
memorandum, which the Court considered in a footnote.224 After a summary
recitation of section 61 10(k)(3), the Court addressed the substance of the
memorandum, noting that it described a situation "entirely different" from the
one presented in Hill.225 Although the Court eventually ruled against the
taxpayers, its noticeable effort to distinguish a technical advice memorandum
in the taxpayers' favor indicates that the Court continues to find the Service's
informal rulings educational despite section 6110 of the Code.
(e) Courts of Appeals Take the Extra Step
Courts of appeals have, to some extent, taken the high court's cue. As a
result, private letter rulings might serve as the basis of a consistency claim in
2 61d. at 261-62, 262 n.17 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6507023460A (Jul. 2, 1965); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5710044200A (Oct. 4, 1957); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5501244180A (Jan. 24, 1955);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5403042970A (Mar. 4, 1954); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5401062910A (Jan. 6,
1954)).
1171d. (citing I.R.C. § 61 10(k)(3) (2000)).
2 181d.
2 19 1d.
220Hanover Bank v. Comm'r, 369 U.S. 672,686-87 (1962).
2211d. at 686.
222See United States v. Hill, 506 U.S. 546, 564 n.12 (1993) (discussing effect of private
letter ruling on pending case).2231d. at 548.




some circuits where they are admissible as "evidence" rather than as"precedent." In its oft-cited decision in Xerox Corp. v. United States,226 the
Court of Claims adopted a district court decision that referred to three private
letter rulings.227 The Court of Claims ruled that the lower court had the right to
228consider both formal and informal rulings of the Service. After careful
consideration, the court held that the Service had adopted the doctrine at issue
through its rulings and could not then disavow the doctrine for the sole reason
that it produced a good result for the taxpayer in the case.22 9
In Niles v. United States,230 the Ninth Circuit held that letter rulings may
be used to demonstrate a "continuous administrative practice. ' 231 In that case,
the Service sought to allocate a portion of a jury award to future medical
expenses and then disallow deductions for those expenses.232 The court found
that no statute or case granted the Service authority to make such allocations,
and it wrote that the government's attempt to allocate a portion of the jury
award to medical expenses changed "an administrative practice almost as old
as the income tax itself., 233 The court looked to two private letter rulings as
proof of the practice. 4 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit followed suit in Comerica
Bank v. United States235 by looking to a private letter ruling for assistance in
deciphering the language of a trust.
236
The Court of Federal Claims took a firmer stance in Vons Companies, Inc.
v. United States.237 The taxpayer in that case requested production of
background documents related to certain private letter rulings and technical
advice memoranda in an effort to show that similarly situated taxpayers had
received more favorable treatment.238 The taxpayer itself had not requested a
ruling.239 The court denied the taxpayer's request by holding that the taxpayer
226656 F.2d 659 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
227See id. at 660.2281d. The lower court based its analysis on four factors common to revenue rulings and
private letter rulings cited by the taxpayer. Id. at 674. Three of the four factors appeared in both
revenue rulings and private letter rulings, but the fourth appeared only in a private letter ruling.
Id. (citations omitted).2291d. at 660.
230710 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1983).
21d. at 1393.
132d. at 1392-93.
2331d. at 1393.234See id. at 1393-94 (looking at I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6207314840A (Jul. 31, 1962) and
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6510284440A (Oct. 28, 1965)). The court held that the Service could not
deviate from its usual position, which was firmly entrenched, for the purpose of a single audit.
Id. at 1393.
23593 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1996).
236See id. at 229-30 (looking at I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-49-21 (Aug. 27, 1979)). The court
concluded that the language of both the private letter ruling and the trust supported the
taxpayer's argument. Id. at 230.
23751 Fed. Cl. 1, 8-11 (2001).238Id. at 8-9.
291d. at 23.
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could not demand consistent treatment based on the Service's informal
rulings.24 ° The court held that informal rulings are relevant for only two
purposes: to demonstrate that the Service has an administrative practice of
issuing rulings on a given subject, or to demonstrate that the Service has
abused its discretion under the IBM rule.24 1 Because the taxpayer in Vons
sought recourse to the actual contents of the rulings and their supporting files,
the court denied its request for production.242
In contrast, a district court in Maryland recently held that field service
advice was relevant to a taxpayer's case for purposes of discovery under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.243 That rule permits discovery of evidence
that is "relevant to the claim or defense of any party." 24 The item requested for
production "need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.,
245 In
the case at issue, the Service inadvertently produced unredacted field service
advice in response to the taxpayer's request. 246 When the court ordered the
taxpayer to return the unredacted document, the taxpayer urged the court to
reconsider its decision because a portion of the document contained the
Service's legal analysis. 247 Although the court did not address whether the field
service advice would be admissible at trial for any specific purpose, it noted
that the Service's interpretation could be relevant to the penalty portion of the
taxpayer's case and that "the great weight of authority" supported use of the
Service's informal rulings for nonprecedential purposes. 248 As a result, the
court found that discovery of the field service advice was proper under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26.249
The Xerox, Niles, Comerica Bank, Vons, and Black & Decker decisions
indicate that courts will, in some circumstances, consider as evidence not only
the existence of private letter rulings, but also their contents. The Vons court,
which wrote by far the strictest decision of the five, agreed with its sister courts
that taxpayers may submit private letter rulings as evidence of administrative
24°/d. at 9, 23-24.
2411d. at 12 (citing Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 924 (Ct. Cl.
1965)).2421d. at 23-24.
243Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, No. Civ.A.WDQ-02-2070, 2004 WL 500847, at
*4 (D. Md. Feb; 19, 2004).
244FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
245id"
246Black & Decker, 2004 WL 500847, at *1.
2471d. The Service sought exclusion of the legal analysis under Freedom of Information
Act exemption 7(A), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000), which permits nondisclosure of records
compiled for law enforcement purposes if their production would interfere with enforcement
proceedings. Black & Decker, 2004 WL 500847, at *3. The court wrote that it could not imagine
how disclosure of the Service's legal analysis of the pertinent statutes and cases could interfere





practice. 250 Although the Vons court dismissed the idea that consistency could
apply to the Service outside of the IBM context, it is unclear what relevance an
administrative practice would have outside of a claim for consistency. Taken
as a whole, the body of decisions discussed above shows that section
6110(k)(3) of the Code should not prevent courts from using private letter
rulings as evidence in consistency cases. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate
that some courts have already mandated consistency based not only on the
existence but also on the contents of private letter rulings.
IV. CONSISTENCY AS IT SHOULD APPLY TO THE SERVICE TOMORROW
It is clear that courts are sometimes willing to impose a duty of
administrative consistency on the Service, and that sometimes they are not.
The remainder of this Article argues that courts should adopt a broader duty of
consistency applicable to the Service. Such a duty already applies to agencies
that are called on solely to administer the law. 25' The Service's role as an
interpreter as well as an administrator should not place it beyond the reach of
the duty of consistency.
A. Reasons for the Taxpayer Duty of Consistency Apply to the Service with
Equal Force
The courts and commentators discussed above have forwarded a number
of justifications for retaining the taxpayer duty of consistency. Nearly all of
them apply to the Service with equal force. The first and most obvious
argument in favor of the duty is that it fosters fairness and justice.252 Most
other arguments in its favor are somehow related to this starting point. For
instance, one commentator has noted that the duty of consistency buttresses the
self-reporting system by reducing the temptation to misrepresent facts and by
bolstering public confidence in the fairness of the system.253 A second
argument contends that where the effects of a taxpayer's representation project
into future years, the duty of consistency will result in a more accurate
application of the tax law by preventing the taxpayer from double-dipping. 4
A third argument in favor of the taxpayer duty of consistency asserts that
allowing taxpayers to retract a prior representation would complicate
250See Von Companies, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. CI. 1, 12 (2001).251See Zelenak, supra note 198, at 412-15 (discussing duty of administrative consistency
expected of agencies).252See Estate of Ashman v. Comm'r, 231 F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e are of the
opinion that the duty of consistency not only reflects basic fairness, but also shows a proper
regard for the administration of justice and the dignity of the law.").253See Johnson, supra note 16, at 545.254See Alamo Nat'l Bank of San Antonio v. Comm'r, 95 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1938);
Johnson, supra note 16, at 547.
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administration by encouraging taxpayers to vacillate.255 Requiring consistency,
then, ensures the finality of past transactions and solidifies their effect on
future years.
256
Stated differently, first, our notion of fair play is offended when a
taxpayer benefits from treating a single transaction in two different ways.
Second, if we allow taxpayers to change their minds about their transactions
after the statute of limitations expires, our already complex system of taxation
will become even more complex. Third, without a taxpayer duty of
consistency, the government will collect the wrong amount of money from
people who inconsistently report related transactions.257
The unifying principle at the heart of these arguments is that inconsistent
input produces bad output. The fruits of inconsistency are unfair. They injure
the public's confidence in the Service, and they result, of necessity, in
inaccurate collection of revenue. Finally, they make the tax system more
complicated. Because these are bad ends, we should discourage any means
used to accomplish them, whether those means are employed by taxpayers or
the Service. In other words, it is unfair for the Service to treat a single
transaction or identical transactions in two different ways to extract more or
less money from a taxpayer than the Code requires. In addition, such
inconsistent behavior might discourage taxpayers from seeking the Service's
advice, which would increase perceived complexity and actual transaction
costs in the form of additional attorneys' fees and tax insurance premiums for
taxpayers engaging in complicated transactions.
Failing to allow taxpayer claims against the Service based on inconsistent
treatment not only offends our broader notions of fairness and due process;
such failure also renders a class of wrongful acts by the Service wholly
unreviewable. Where the Service treats two similarly situated taxpayers
differently, there is no question that it fails to uphold the revenue laws with
respect to one of them. In order to do so, the Service must exercise discretion.
If that exercise of discretion is permitted by statute, the IBM case tells us that
the Service must answer to the duty of consistency. If the exercise of discretion
is not permitted by statute, current case law holds that, absent special
circumstances, a taxpayer who is prejudiced by the Service has no recourse.
That answer is clearly wrong. In the first instance, Congress permits the
Service to act with discretion. If it abuses its discretion, only one sin is
committed-the abuse. In the second instance, Congress has not granted
discretion, so two sins are committed-unauthorized use of discretion and the
abuse of that discretion. It is nonsensical for courts to review taxpayer
255See Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1965).256See Johnson, supra note 16, at 546.257That is not to say that the government will necessarily collect the right amount under the
duty of consistency. Rather, the government will come closer to collecting the right amount than
it would without the duty.
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complaints of the first instance but not of the second. As a result, a broad duty
of consistency should apply to the Service.
Finally, a strong argument exists that Congress has granted discretion to
the Service in all instances by failing to provide the Service with resources
adequate to its task. A corollary to this argument is that even if the Service's
funding were adequate, Congress has granted discretion to the Service by
promulgating a set of revenue laws so voluminous as to be humanly
unenforceable. Faced with both problems-inadequate funding and
excessively complicated laws-the Service's de facto discretion in the
prosecution of taxpayers is unavoidable. Courts should acknowledge this
discretion rather than turn a blind eye to it. Stated differently, if courts must
find some statutory mooring for the duty of consistency, they could look to
Congress's appropriations to the Service in comparison to the volume of work
annually allocated to it by statute. Then they would be faced with the
inescapable conclusion that the Service must choose its battles. It is not too
much to ask that those choices be consistent.
B. Arguments against an IRS Duty of Consistency
Regardless of its folk appeal and policy justifications, courts and
commentators have forwarded a number of arguments against imposing a full
duty of consistency on the Service. All of these arguments ignore the basic
question of fairness raised by dissimilar treatment of similar taxpayers. In
addition, arguments against the duty of consistency fail to address the bad
consequences of inconsistent administration described above. Regardless, these
arguments represent a reasoned point of view that should be addressed in an
effort to craft an enforceable standard. The following paragraphs describe
counterarguments to the Service's duty of consistency and find those
arguments unconvincing.
One argument against applying a duty of consistency to the Service is that
the Service is not vested with enough discretion to justify use of the duty.258
This argument focuses on two aspects of discretion. First, it notes that
Congress has not granted explicit or implicit statutory discretion to the Service
in application of the laws.259 Second, the argument notes that revenue laws are
so detailed that they generally leave little room for creative application. 260 As
noted above, practical considerations dictate that the Service actually does
have discretion to deviate from the black letter law due to the complexity of
258See Zelenak, supra note 198, at 411 (observing that Service interprets statutes to vest it
with little discretion).259See generally Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558, 562 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (holding
employee of Internal Revenue Bureau to be unauthorized to act as agent of United States);
Knetch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (holding that taxpayers may not rely
on private rulings issued to other individuals).260See Zelenak, supra note 198, at 411.
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that law and the inadequacy of resources allocated to the Service for the
enforcement of that law. Even setting those considerations to one side, the
sheer size of the Service alone makes consistent enforcement of the law highly
unlikely. To the extent that Service employees make inconsistent decisions
deliberately or by accident, the Service exercises de facto administrative
discretion. As a result, any argument against the duty of consistency based on
the Service's lack of discretion must fail.
Another barrier to a duty of consistency applicable to the Service is
section 61 10(k)(3). One commentator has noted that "[p]rivate letter rulings
would seem to be the primary means of demonstrating Service inconsistency
because they are numerous, readily obtainable, thoroughly indexed, and
represent the Service's considered views on the merits of the questions of law
addressed. ''261 As a result, section 6110 might be viewed as an impediment to
applying a duty of consistency to the Service. Regardless, courts have
distinguished precedential use of letter rulings from evidentiary use, as
discussed above. Although the line dividing the two seems unclear, the
Supreme Court accepted the precedent-versus-evidence dichotomy in its
Hanover Bank and Rowan decisions. As a result, section 6110 should not
prevent courts from applying a duty of consistency to the Service with regard
to private letter rulings.
A third complaint against application of a broad duty of consistency to the
Service is that the duty will reduce tax administration to the "least common
denominator. , 262 The Vons court stated the problem as follows:
The question of whether a court should impose a duty of
consistency on the Service arises when the Service asserts a position
against one taxpayer which is justified under the court's
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, but which the Service has not asserted and does not intend to
assert against similarly-situated taxpayers. To impose a duty of
consistency in those situations is to give taxpayers lenient treatment
that is not justified under the substantive law.263
In other words, in a nonduty world, if the Service gives a break to one
taxpayer but not to others, there is only one infraction of the law. In a duty
world, by contrast, if the Service gives a break to one taxpayer, it must then
give the same break to all comers, which will result in multiple infractions of
the law.
There are two responses to this argument. First, the duty of consistency
produces a similar distortion when applied to taxpayers, but in those cases
courts eschew proper administration of the law in favor of equitable
2611d. at 433-34.262Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed C1. 1, 10 n.10 (2001).263Zelenak, supra note 198, at 41 1.
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considerations. The same treatment should apply in reverse. Second, holding
the Service accountable for its inconsistent acts by allowing all similarly
situated taxpayers to benefit from them could deter the Service from showing
favoritism or from giving bad ruling advice. For instance, if the Service had
known in 1955 that it would be required to give a tax break not only to
Remington Rand, but also to its competitor, the Service might have considered
the matter more fully before forgoing revenue that it was entitled to collect. As
a result, the lowest common denominator argument carries little weight.
There is a third, closely related argument against imposing a broad duty of
consistency on the Service. Some opponents of the duty fear that it will have a
chilling effect on the Service's ruling and information-sharing functions.
64
While this argument is more persuasive than the first two, it does not outweigh
arguments in favor of the duty. Even if the duty of consistency caused the
Service to employ a more rigorous process of ruling review, there is no
guarantee that increased scrutiny would result in an information bottleneck.
Furthermore, if a bottleneck did result, or if the Service simply refused to grant
rulings in difficult cases, Congress could step in to correct the problem.
A fourth argument against the duty of consistency is that it would prevent
the Service from providing relief to taxpayers with hard-luck cases. This
argument is also not persuasive. A taxpayer who faces significant hardship as a
result of Service action is differently situated from a taxpayer who will not face
hardship. The Code and Treasury Regulations are replete with examples that
bear out this assertion.265 The law clearly expresses Congress's view that
hardship is relevant to a taxpayer's interactions with the Service. As a result,
there is ample ground for a court to hold that a taxpayer who is facing
significant hardship and one who is not are not similarly situated for purposes
of applying the duty of consistency.
V. CONCLUSION
The arguments for application of a broader duty of consistency to the
Service outweigh the arguments against it. In addition, there is at least some
modicum of judicial support for the idea. 66 Finally, our history and sense of
264See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,433 (1990).
265Section 6163 provides a hardship exception for timely filing of tax returns for remainder
or reversionary trust interests. See I.R.C. § 6163 (2000). Section 412 provides an exception to
minimum plan funding requirements in cases of business hardship. See id. § 412(d)(1). Section
3406 provides relief from backup withholding in cases of hardship. See id. § 3406(c)(3). Section
6161 provides a hardship exception for timely payment of a deficiency. See id. § 6161(b)(1).
Finally, the Taxpayer Advocate is authorized to provide assistance and relief in cases of
significant hardship or irreparable injury. See Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
Who May Use the Taxpayer Advocate Service?, http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id=
97395,00.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).266For instance, IBM, Computer Sciences Corp., Alamo National Bank, Conway Import
Co., and Sirbo, discussed above, all require consistent actions from the Service. See Int'l Bus.
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 920 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Computer Sciences Corp. v.
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justice demand it. Courts should require the Service to give similar treatment to
similarly situated taxpayers and should accept written rulings as evidence of
disparate treatment.267 Whether a taxpayer is similarly situated to others should
depend on facts relevant to the operation of the statute or statutes in question.
In addition, courts should acknowledge that taxpayers under significant
hardship are not similarly situated to those who are not. Doing so will allow
the Service to consider equity in cases where it is necessary. In addition, if a
broader duty of consistency is to comport with Supreme Court jurisprudence,
the Service must be afforded an opportunity to correct its mistakes. To ensure
that those corrections are fair to taxpayers, the Service should make them in
the most transparent way possible. Therefore, courts should adopt the rule in
Conway Import Co.,268 which would permit taxpayers to use written rulings as
evidence of disparate treatment until the Service publishes its change of
position in writing.
By adopting the positions above, courts would not only afford taxpayers
fair treatment, they would also decrease transaction costs and increase
efficiency by making tax results more reliable. For decades, agency rhetoric
and court dicta have supported a consistency requirement while actual
decisions have suppressed such a result. Applying a broad-based duty of
consistency to the Service is not a new idea, but it is one whose time has come.
Ample precedent exists for imposition of the duty, and justice demands it.
United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 388, 393 (2001); Alamo Nat'l Bank of San Antonio v. Comm'r, 95
F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1938); Conway Import Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 5, 14-15
(E.D.N.Y 1969); Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Comm'r, 476 F.2d 981, 987 (2d Cir. 1973).267Although not fully explored in this article, at first blush, it seems that the use of other
forms of evidence would result in an irreconcilable conflict between the law of estoppel and the
duty of consistency. A taxpayer cannot recover in estoppel against the Service if the taxpayer
relies, to its detriment, on an unauthorized act or statement of a Service employee made to that
taxpayer. See Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558, 562 (Ct. Cl. 1965). Likewise, a similarly
situated taxpayer should not be permitted to rely on the same unauthorized statement or action
under the duty of consistency. Limiting evidence of disparate treatment to written rulings would
prevent such reliance.268Conway Import Co., 311 F. Supp. at 8-15.
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